This	is	a	previous	draft	of	the	article	"Explaining	the	Knobe	effect"	that	is	published	in:	Luetge, Hannes	Rusch	&	Matthias	Uhl	(eds.),	Experimental	Ethics.	Palgrave	Macmillan	65-79	(2014). Please,	do	not	quote	from	the	draft. Contact:	v.wagner@uni-konstanz.de Verena	Wagner:	Explaining	the	Knobe	effect Abstract:	In	this	paper	I	reject	the	view	that	the	famous	'Knobe	effect'	reveals	an	asymmetry	within people's	judgments	concerning	actions	with	good	or	bad	side	effects.	I	agree	with	interpretations	that	see the	ascriptions	made	by	survey	subjects	as	moral	judgments	rather	than	ascriptions	of	intentionality.	On this	basis,	I	provide	an	explanation	as	to	why	people	are	right	in	blaming	and	'expraising'	agents	that	acted on	unacceptable	motives,	but	praise	and	excuse	agents	who	meet	intersubjective	expectations	by	acting on	acceptable	motives.	The	asymmetry	only	arises	when	blameworthiness	and	praiseworthiness	are	seen as	instances	of	one	and	the	same	concept:	moral	responsibility.	This	analysis	is	backed	by	a	study	of Joshua	Shepherd	who	extended	and	varied	Knobe's	original	vignettes. 1	Introduction Joshua	Knobe	famously	conducted	several	case	studies	in	which	he	confronted	survey	subjects with	a	chairman	who	decides	to	start	a	new	program	in	order	to	increase	profits	and	by	doing	so brings	about	certain	foreseen	side	effects.	Depending	on	what	the	side	effect	is	in	the	respective case,	either	harming	or	helping	the	environment,	people	gave	asymmetric	answers	to	the question	as	to	whether	or	not	the	chairman	brought	about	the	side	effect	intentionally.	82	per cent	of	those	subjects	confronted	with	the	harm	scenario	judged	the	chairman	to	have	harmed the	environment	intentionally,	but	only	23	per	cent	of	the	subjects	confronted	with	the	help scenario	judged	the	chairman	to	have	helped	the	environment	intentionally	(Knobe	2003a).	This at	first	sight	surprising	asymmetry	is	called	the	"Knobe	effect"	and	together	with	the	explanation Knobe	provided	for	his	findings	it	gave	rise	to	a	great	amount	of	responses	in	the	literature. Many	follow-up	studies	were	conducted	that	were	meant	either	to	confirm	or	to	reject	the	Knobe effect	and	many	comments	were	written	on	how	to	interpret	the	data	correctly.	Most	of	these very	different	responses	share	the	view	that	the	asymmetry	is	surprising	and	has	to	be explained:	the	chairman	went	through	the	same	reasoning	and	decision	process,	both	side effects	are	equally	foreseen	by	the	chairman,	his	motivation	(which	is	making	profit)	is	both times	the	very	same	and	there	is	no	external	influence	that	could	explain	why	people	judge	his harming	the	environment	to	be	brought	about	intentionally,	but	helping	the	environment	not	to be.	The	only	difference	seems	to	be	that	harming	the	environment	is	considered	to	be	bad	and helping	the	environment	is	considered	to	be	good.	Indeed,	this	asymmetry	is	in	need	of explanation. In	this	paper	I	aim	at	providing	an	explanation	of	the	Knobe	effect	that	is	based	on	the	claim	that people	are	in	fact	judging	an	agent	morally	when	they	ascribe	intentionality	to	an	agent's behaviour.	This	kind	of	interpretation	involves	no	new	insight	and	variations	of	it	are	given	in several	responses	to	the	Knobe	effect,	e.g.	in	Adams	and	Steadman	2004ab.	But	unlike	many other	defenders	of	this	claim,	I	do	not	think	that	this	is	sufficient	for	an	explanation.	Such	an approach	can	be	a	first	step,	but	it	provides	no	explanation	of	the	asymmetry	itself,	because	the same	asymmetry	arises	when	the	chairman	is	judged	to	be	responsible	for	harming,	but	not responsible	for	helping	the	environment.	A	sufficient	explanation	additionally	requires	either	an explanation	of	why	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility,	in	contrast	to	the	concept	of	intentional action,	contains	an	asymmetry	that	justifies	people's	diverging	judgments;	or	it	has	to	explain why	people	wrongly	apply	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility	in	an	asymmetric	way.	There	is	no explanation	given	by	merely	stating	that	people	judge	the	chairman	to	be	responsible	for	the	bad side	effect	but	not	to	be	responsible	for	the	good	one	under	the	same	circumstances.	I	defend	the view	that	people	–	though	being	mistaken	in	their	asymmetric	ascription	of	intentionality	–	are doing	the	right	thing	in	judging	the	harming	chairman	to	be	blameworthy,	but	the	helping chairman	to	be	not	praiseworthy.	However,	I	aim	at	showing	that	the	ascriptions	interpreted	in this	way	do	not	involve	an	asymmetry	after	all.	The	asymmetry	only	arises	when	praise	and blame	are	subsumed	under	one	the	same	concept:	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility. Among	all	the	follow-up	studies	that	were	made	after	Knobe's	original	findings,	there	is	one study	I	will	refer	to	in	detail.	Joshua	Shepherd	conducted	a	series	of	surveys	in	2011	that	are based	on	Knobe's	chairman	cases	and	an	example	of	Phelan	and	Sarkissian	(2008)	of	a	city planner	who	produces	good	or	bad	side	effects	in	the	course	of	cleaning	an	area	from	toxic waste.	Shepherd's	study	is	more	conclusive	than	Knobe's,	because	Shepherd	varies	the	valence of	the	main	goal	(making	profit,	creating	jobs,	cleaning	toxic	area	etc.),	the	valence	of	the	side effect	(poisoning	the	groundwater,	in-/decreasing	joblessness,	in-/decreasing	cancer	levels	etc.) and	he	also	varies	the	agent's	verbally	expressed	attitude	("I	don't	care	about",	"I	feel	terrible about",	"That's	great	news	about"	etc.). 2	Interpreting	the	data Knobe's	original	study	contains	two	case	descriptions	of	a	chairman	who	decides	to	start	a	new program	in	order	to	make	profit.	The	only	difference	between	the	two	descriptions	concerned the	respective	side	effect	that	resulted	from	starting	this	program:	either	the	environment	was helped	or	it	was	harmed. The	vice-president	of	a	company	went	to	the	chairman	of	the	board	and	said,	'We	are	thinking of	starting	a	new	program.	It	will	help	us	increase	profits,	but	[and]	it	will	also	harm	[help]	the environment.'	The	chairman	of	the	board	answered,	'I	don't	care	at	all	about	harming	[helping] the	environment.	I	just	want	to	make	as	much	profit	as	I	can.	Let's	start	the	new	program.'	They started	the	new	program.	Sure	enough,	the	environment	was	harmed	[helped].	(Knobe	2003a) Knobe	presented	the	following	results	after	questioning	survey	subjects	as	to	whether	the chairman	brought	about	the	respective	side	effect	intentionally:	82	per	cent	of	the	subjects confronted	with	the	harm	scenario	judged	the	chairman	to	have	harmed	the	environment intentionally,	but	only	23	per	cent	of	the	subjects	confronted	with	the	help	scenario	judged	the chairman	to	have	helped	the	environment	intentionally.	Knobe	himself	interprets	his	findings	by stating	that	"people's	intuitions	as	to	whether	or	not	a	behavior	was	performed	intentionally	can sometimes	be	influenced	by	moral	considerations"	and	that	"when	people	are	wondering whether	or	not	a	given	behaviour	was	performed	intentionally,	they	are	sometimes	influenced by	their	beliefs	about	whether	the	behaviour	itself	was	good	or	bad".	(Knobe	et	al.	2006,	p.	205) In	a	later	article,	Knobe	claims	"there	is	a	psychological	process	that	makes	people	more	willing to	apply	the	concept	[e.g.	of	intentional	action]	in	cases	of	morally	bad	side-effects	and	less willing	to	apply	the	concept	in	cases	of	morally	good	side-effects."	(Pettit	and	Knobe	2009,	p. 590)	For	sure,	moral	considerations	do	play	a	role	here,	but	it	is	doubtful	whether	Knobe	is	right that	the	application	of	concepts	is	generally	affected	by	moral	considerations	about	the	goodness or	badness	of	the	side	effect	such	that	people	are	influenced	in	a	way	they	should	not	be. Adams	and	Steadman	(2004a,	2004b)	interpret	the	data	by	reference	to	a	pragmatic	usage	of intentional	language:	while	"the	folk	do	not	normally	possess	a	clearly	articulated	theory	of	the mental	mechanisms	of	intentional	action[,	they]	do	possess	a	very	clear	notion	of	the	pragmatic features	of	intentional	action	and	talk	of	intentional	action	due	to	the	role	of	talk	of	intention	in social	praise	and	blame."	(2004a,	p.	177)	Further,	Adams	and	Steadman	contend: We	suspect	that	what	is	going	on	in	the	minds	of	the	folk	is	that	they	disapprove	of	the chairman's	indifference	to	the	harm	of	the	environment.	They	want	to	blame	that	indifference and	they	know	that	their	blame	is	stronger	and	more	effective	at	discouraging	such	acts,	if	the chairman	is	said	to	have	done	the	action	intentionally.	(Adams	and	Steadman	2004a,	p.	178) I	agree	with	views	like	the	one	of	Adams	and	Steadman	that	survey	subjects	actually	ascribe blameworthiness	to	the	harming	chairman	but	withhold	praiseworthiness	from	the	helping chairman,	and	for	this	purpose	they	use	the	vocabulary	of	intentionally	harming	but	not intentionally	helping	the	environment.	But	subjects	are	mistaken	here.	It	may	be	useful	within	a pragmatic	context	to	ascribe	intentionality	towards	an	agent	that	is	regarded	as	a	proper	target of	blame	("It's	your	fault,	you	did	it	on	purpose!")	and	to	withhold	the	ascription	of	intentionality towards	an	agent	who	is	seen	as	no	proper	target	of	praise	("It's	not	your	credit,	you	didn't	do	it intentionally!")	in	order	to	emphasize	the	underlying	moral	judgment;	nevertheless,	this	is	no good	reason	to	conclude	that	the	concept	of	intentional	behaviour	inherits	a	real	asymmetry people	refer	to.	Indeed,	in	both	scenarios	the	chairman	brought	about	the	side	effect intentionally:	he	intentionally	harmed	the	environment	and	he	intentionally	helped	the environment	though	he	intended	neither	of	it.	Albeit	both	chairmen	brought	about	their respective	side	effect	intentionally,	the	one	is	blameworthy	for	the	produced	harm,	but	the	other is	not	praiseworthy	for	the	produced	help.	The	asymmetry	within	the	ascription	of intentionality,	leads	back	to	this	asymmetry	between	praise	and	blame.	However,	this explanation	provides	no	answer	to	the	question	concerning	the	source	of	the	asymmetry	and merely	locates	the	asymmetry	somewhere	else:	in	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility.	In	the following,	I	will	refer	to	this	asymmetry	between	the	ascription	of	blame	and	praise	rather	than the	asymmetry	within	subjects'	ascription	of	intentional	action.	Further,	I	will	argue	that	there	is no	such	asymmetry	when	praise	and	blame	are	not	subsumed	under	one	concept. 3	Some	Shepherd	effects In	this	section	I	will	point	out	briefly	in	what	way	Shepherd	extended	Knobe's	original	setting and	what	effects	resulted	from	these	changes.	Further,	I	will	aim	at	explaining	the	Knobe	effect and	the	additional	effects	found	by	Shepherd.	In	the	surveys,	Shepherd	sticks	to	Knobe's	original example	of	a	chairman	who	starts	a	new	program	and	produces	environmental	side	effects. Additionally,	he	uses	an	example	of	Phelan	and	Sarkissian	(2008,	p.	296f)	in	which	a	city	planner starts	a	program	in	order	to	clean	up	toxic	waste,	which	also	produces	certain	side	effects. Shepherd	compares	the	original	not	caring	but	profit	driven	chairman	with	a	chairman	who	is still	profit	driven	but	has	another	attitude	towards	the	side	effect:	he	either	feels	terrible	about harming	the	environment	or	he	is	happy	about	helping	the	environment.	Additionally,	Shepherd compares	all	these	cases	with	a	chairman	who	has	a	nobler	main	goal:	creating	jobs	for	the homeless	and	disadvantaged.	Correspondingly,	Shepherd	makes	certain	variations	in	the	city planner's	example:	he	manipulates	the	valence	of	the	main	goal	(making	profit	vs.	cleaning	up toxic	waste),	the	badness	of	the	side	effects	(poisoning	the	groundwater	vs.	raising	joblessness) and	the	goodness	of	the	side	effects	(decreasing	joblessness	vs.	decreasing	cancer	levels). Shepherd	predicts	that	his	results	will	show	effects	on	the	agent's	attitude,	on	the	valence	of	the main	goal	and	on	the	valence	of	the	respective	side	effects.	Surprisingly,	only	an	insignificant effect	for	the	agent's	attitude	emerged	when	the	side	effect	was	bad,	but	there	was	a	significant effect	on	the	agent's	attitude	when	the	side	effect	was	good.	Changes	of	the	respective	valence	of the	main	goal	and	the	side	effect	did	produce	an	effect	when	the	side	effect	was	bad,	but	none when	the	side	effect	was	good.	Shepherd	interprets	these	findings	as	follows: While	the	valence	of	an	agent's	main	goal	or	side	effect	significantly	impacts	folk	ascriptions	in harming	cases,	the	agent's	attitude	does	so	in	helping	cases.	[...]	the	asymmetry	might	result from	the	spontaneous	triggering	of	a	schema	linking	norm	violations	with	intentionality	–	a schema	not	triggering	by	instances	of	helping.	(Shepherd	2011,	p.	181) In	the	following	I	will	comment	on	Shepherd's	assumptions	and	findings.	I	will	start	with	my own	explanation	of	the	Knobe	effect	based	on	Shepherd's	results.	Then,	I	will	discuss	Shepherd's result	that	the	agent's	attitude	seems	to	have	an	effect	in	helping	cases	though	no	significant effect	in	harming	cases.	I	will	not	give	further	arguments	for	treating	ascriptions	and	nonascriptions	of	intentionality	as	moral	judgments	in	the	way	Adams	and	Steadman	propose.	My central	aim	is	to	show	that	there	is	no	asymmetry	in	blaming	the	harming	chairman	though	not praising	the	helping	chairman. 3.1	Subjective	and	intersubjective	valence Shepherd	describes	the	valence	of	creating	jobs	for	the	homeless	and	disadvantaged	as	"better" than	the	chairman's	original	main	goal	of	making	profit.	In	the	same	sense	the	side	effect	of poisoned	groundwater	is	set	as	"worse"	than	raising	joblessness,	and	decreasing	cancer	levels	is set	to	be	"better"	than	decreasing	joblessness.	Shepherd	seems	to	assume	that	people	commonly share	this	structure	of	valence	in	general;	and	he	seems	to	assume	an	intersubjective	agreement among	people's	judgment	according	to	which	a	main	goal	or	a	side	effect	is	judged	to	be	good	or bad,	and	according	to	which	some	are	"better"	or	"worse"	than	others.	This	is	a	very	important assumption,	because	it	shows	on	what	basis	survey	subjects	are	invited	to	form	their	moral judgments.	Further,	it	is	this	intersubjective	agreement	that	underlies	such	valence	talk	that gives	rise	to	certain	moral	expectations	towards	agents	and	their	behaviour	in	certain circumstances.	If	the	valence	of	the	side	effect's	occurrence	is	found	to	be	worse	than	the	nonachievement	of	an	agent's	main	goal,	it	is	expected	from	the	agent	that	she	refrains	from performing	the	action	in	order	to	avoid	the	side	effect.	The	profit-driven	chairman	is	morally expected	not	to	start	the	program	in	order	to	avoid	environmental	harm,	because	the	valence	of harming	the	environment	is	seen	as	far	worse	than	the	valence	of	the	chairman's	not	making profit.	Correspondingly,	avoidance	of	environmental	harm	is	seen	as	far	more	important	than the	chairman's	making	profit.	The	chairman,	of	course,	thinks	otherwise.	For	him,	not	making profit	is	worse	than	harming	the	environment	and,	therefore,	he	starts	the	program	disregarding the	fact	that	by	doing	so	the	environment	will	be	harmed.	This	does	not	necessarily	mean	that the	chairman	does	not	know	about	the	intersubjective	perspective	and	the	corresponding expectations	as	a	matter	of	fact,	the	experimental	setting	make	sure	that	he	is	aware	of	this:	the vice-president	mentions	the	harming	side	effect	as	a	potential	problem	and	the	chairman	affirms that	he	knows	about	the	resulting	harm.	Nonetheless,	the	chairman	rather	acts	on	his	main	goal disregarding	the	intersubjective	expectation.	That	is	why	subjects	judge	him	to	be	blameworthy for	harming	the	environment.	His	subjective	valence	or	preference	structure	"making	profit	is more	important	than	the	environment"	does	not	match	the	intersubjective	expectation	"the environment	is	more	important	than	making	profit".	Because	of	this	mismatch,	the	chairman	is blamed	for	having	started	the	program	disregarding	the	resulting	environmental	harm.	This mismatch	does	not	only	explain	why	the	harming	chairman	is	judged	to	be	blameworthy	(by means	of	ascribing	intentionality),	but	also	explains	why	the	helping	chairman	is	not	found	to	be praiseworthy	for	the	good	side	effect. Blaming	an	agent	is	not	the	only	negative	reactive	attitude:	one	can	have	a	negative	attitude towards	a	person	who	does	bad	and	towards	a	person	who	does	good.	But	of	course,	one	cannot blame	a	person	for	producing	good	side	effects	even	if	she	did	not	care	about	producing	these. Yet,	what	one	can	do	is	to	withhold	moral	praise.	Withholding	praise	from	a	person	is	a	negative attitude,	too.	This	kind	of	resentment	is	what	I	call	'expraising'	an	agent.	An	agent	who	is expraised	is	not	judged	as	a	proper	target	of	praise	as	well	as	an	agent	who	is	excused	is	not	a proper	target	of	accusation	or	blame.	The	chairman	who	started	the	program	in	order	to	make profit	and	thereby,	as	a	side	effect,	helped	the	environment	has	the	very	same	inacceptable preference	as	the	chairman	who	harmed	the	environment	by	starting	the	profitable	program: neither	of	them	cares	about	the	environment	and	both	strongly	prefer	to	make	profit.	The chairman's	subjective	preference	"making	profit	is	more	important	than	the	environment"	is	not in	accordance	with	intersubjective	expectations.	This	is	so	independently	of	the	respective goodness	or	badness	of	the	outcome.	The	goodness	or	badness	of	the	outcome	does	not	change the	general	negative	reactive	attitude,	but	only	determines	whether	an	agent	is	to	be	blamed	or expraised:	since	the	action	in	the	help	scenario	did	not	have	a	bad	side	effect,	the	chairman cannot	be	blamed	for	having	done	the	action	under	his	bad	preference	structure.	However,	he can	be	expraised	from	having	performed	the	action	that	led	to	good	side	effects.	Because	both reactive	attitudes	–	blaming	and	expraising	an	agent	–	are	negative	attitudes	of	resentment, there	is	no	asymmetry	in	subjects'	judgments	concerning	the	chairman	when	they	are	read	as moral	judgments. In	the	same	way	as	we	can	have	negative	reactive	attitudes	towards	agents	who	perform	actions with	bad	side	effects	and	towards	agents	who	perform	actions	with	good	outcomes,	it	is	possible to	have	positive	reactive	attitudes	towards	agents	who	perform	actions	with	good	outcomes	and towards	those	who	perform	actions	with	bad	outcomes.	It	is	certainly	debateable	whether	moral praise	is	reserved	only	for	those	who	do	better	than	what	is	morally	expected	or	is	also	available for	those	who	simply	meet	moral	expectations	in	their	actions.	This	is	indeed	an	interesting	and important	question	but	it	shall	not	be	a	central	question	of	this	paper.	What	seems	to	be	clear	is that	an	agent	is	a	proper	target	of	moral	praise	only	if	she	(at	least)	meets	moral	expectations. Knobe's	original	case	descriptions	do	not	provide	for	an	agent	who	acts	in	accordance	with intersubjective	expectation.	As	I	pointed	out	before,	the	chairman	of	the	help	scenario	as	well	as the	chairman	of	the	harm	scenario	have	unacceptable	preferences:	both	do	not	care	about	the environment	and	strongly	prefer	making	profit	to	caring	about	environmental	issues.	In	both cases,	survey	subjects	showed	negative	reactive	attitudes	of	blame	and	expraise.	Shepherd's extension	makes	us	see	positive	attitudes	towards	an	agent.	In	a	variation	of	the	help	scenario, Shepherd	makes	the	chairman	say:	"That's	great	news	about	helping	the	environment! Ultimately,	though,	I	want	to	make	as	much	profit	as	I	can."	(Shepherd	2011,	p.	183)	This	caring chairman	was	judged	by	62.5	per	cent	of	the	subjects	to	have	helped	intentionally,	while	only 33.75	per	cent	judged	the	not	caring	chairman	to	have	helped	the	environment	intentionally	in	a reproduction	of	Knobe's	original	study.	Even	if	the	results	are	not	as	high	as	in	Knobe's	own surveys,	the	difference	between	judgments	about	the	caring	and	the	not	caring	chairman	is significant.	Similarly	but	less	significant,	54.67	per	cent	judged	the	city	planner	to	have	brought about	the	good	side	effect	intentionally	when	he	expressed	a	positive	attitude	towards	it,	but only	26.67	per	cent	agreed	(and	60	per	cent	disagreed)	that	the	city	planner	brought	about	the good	side	effect	intentionally	when	he	explained	not	to	care	about	it.	These	results	show	that	it	is not	only	the	badness	of	the	side	effect	that	triggers	ascriptions	of	intentionality	as	Knobe claimed;	when	the	agent	shows	sensibility	to	the	goodness	of	the	side	effect,	this	agent	is	judged as	having	brought	about	the	good	side	effect	intentionally.	When	this	ascription	of	intentionality is	interpreted	as	an	ascription	of	moral	responsibility,	the	surveys'	results	indicate	that	the caring	chairman	is	judged	to	be	a	proper	target	of	praise	and	the	caring	city	planner	is	at	least considered	as	such.	By	stating	that	they	consider	it	to	be	great	news	that	their	respective program	will	not	only	increase	profit	(or	create	jobs	or	clean	an	area	from	toxic	waste)	but additionally	has	good	side	effects,	both	agents	at	least	meet	the	intersubjective	expectation	that the	environment	is	something	that	has	to	be	cared	about. After	having	discussed	examples	of	positive	reactions	to	good	side	effects,	the	question	is whether	there	also	is	experimental	support	for	my	claim	that	people	can	have	positive	reactive attitudes	towards	an	agent	who	performed	an	action	that	led	to	bad	side	effects.	Again, Shepherd's	study	provides	such	a	case:	in	the	case	description	of	the	city	planner	who	has	as	his main	goal	to	clean	an	area	from	toxic	waste,	Shepherd	changes	the	valence	of	the	bad	side	effect from	'poisoning	the	groundwater'	to	the	milder	effect	of	'increasing	joblessness'.	While	68.4	per cent	of	the	asked	subjects	agreed	that	the	bad	side	effect	of	poisoned	groundwater	was	brought about	intentionally,	only	47.5	per	cent	agreed	that	increasing	joblessness	was	brought	about intentionally.	Even	if	insignificant,	there	was	also	a	difference	between	the	city	planner	caring and	the	city	planner	not	caring	about	increasing	joblessness	as	a	side	effect	of	cleaning	up	toxic waste;	nevertheless,	Shepherd	points	out	that	this	difference	"did	approach	significance." (Shepherd	2011,	p.	176)	This	may	not	be	perfectly	analogous	to	cases	of	positive	reactive attitudes	in	the	good	side	effects	cases,	but	it	seems	to	speak	for	the	interpretation	that	survey subjects	were	inclined	to	accept	the	caring	city	planner's	preference	to	clean	an	area	from	toxic waste	over	the	comparatively	mild	side	effect	of	raising	joblessness.	At	least	in	parts,	this	city planner	seems	to	be	excused	from	having	performed	an	action	that	led	to	bad	side	effects.	It	can be	speculated	that	this	effect	would	be	more	significant	if	the	case	description	were	modified	in the	following	way:	if	the	city	planner	decides	against	cleaning	up	the	polluted	area,	many citizens	would	become	ill	due	to	the	toxic	waste	in	their	neighbourhood.	Given	this	additional information,	subjects	would	accept	(if	not	expect	from)	any	city	planner	to	start	the	program even	at	the	cost	of	increasing	joblessness,	because	the	consequences	of	not	cleaning	the	area would	be	far	worse.	In	this	new	scenario	one	can	speculate	that	the	city	planner	would	be excused	for	having	performed	an	action	with	bad	side	effects	for	a	greater	and	intersubjectively accepted	good.	Survey	subjects	would	refrain	from	ascribing	intentionality	to	this	city	planner	as a	means	to	excuse	him	from	having	increased	joblessness.	Excusing	an	agent	is,	as	is	praising,	a positive	reactive	attitude	towards	an	agent's	performing	an	action.	Again,	there	is	no	asymmetry in	help	scenarios	when	we	read	subjects'	ascription	of	intentionality	as	a	moral	judgment	of	an agent's	praiseworthiness	and	the	non-ascription	of	intentionality	as	a	means	to	excuse	an	agent. In	both	scenarios,	subjects	express	their	positive	attitude	to	the	respective	agent. In	summary,	we	have	two	pairs	of	reactive	attitudes:	the	ascription	of	blame	and	expraise	are negative	reactive	attitudes	towards	agents	who	act	on	unacceptable	preferences	that	do	not meet	intersubjective	expectations;	and	we	have	the	ascription	of	praise	and	excuse	as	positive reactive	attitudes	towards	agents	who	act	on	accepted	or	expected	preferences.	Maybe	the ascription	of	moral	praise	has	a	special	role	here	and	requires	from	an	agent	not	only	to	meet intersubjective	expectations	in	her	action	but	also	to	exceed	these;	yet,	this	is	the	topic	of	another article	and	cannot	be	discussed	here. Until	now	I	based	my	explanation	of	the	Knobe	effect	on	Shepherd's	results	ignoring	the	fact	that Shepherd	explicitly	separates	effects	that	resulted	from	manipulating	the	agent's	attitude	and effects	that	resulted	from	manipulating	the	valence	of	the	main	goal	and	the	side	effect.	One	of his	main	results	is	that	while	there	was	a	main	effect	on	the	verbally	expressed	attitude	in	help scenarios,	there	was	none	in	harm	scenarios;	and	that	there	was	an	effect	in	harm	scenarios when	he	manipulated	he	valence	of	the	main	goal	or	the	side	effect,	but	none	in	help	scenarios. In	short,	the	agent's	attitude	seems	to	make	a	difference	when	the	side	effect	is	good,	while	it	is the	valence	of	the	main	goal	and	the	side	effect	that	matter	when	the	side	effect	is	bad.	How	to explain	that?	Is	that	not	undermining	my	explanation,	which	generally	makes	use	of	the	subject's reference	to	the	agent's	attitude?	In	the	next	section	I	will	discuss	Shepherd's	distinction	of valence	and	attitude	effects	–	a	distinction	I	consider	to	be	problematic. 3.2	Attitude	as	verbal	expression Shepherd	separates	the	agent's	attitude,	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	valence	of	the	main	goal	and the	side	effect	on	the	other.	In	Shepherd's	approach	the	valence	of	the	main	goal	and	the	valence of	the	side	effect	are	treated	like	agent-external	factors	within	the	case	description	that	are	said to	have	an	impact	on	survey	subjects'	judgments,	but	which	are	considered	to	be	distinct	from the	agent's	attitude	concerning	her	own	action	and	the	resulting	side	effect.	Note	that	the	agent's attitude	refers	to	her	own	action	and	the	resulting	side	effect	and	must	not	be	confused	with 'reactive	attitudes'	survey	subjects	have	when	they	morally	judge	the	agent	in	a	case	description. Shepherd	identifies	the	agent's	attitude	with	the	verbal	expression	that	the	agent	gives	in	the	case description:	"I	don't	care	at	all	about	[the	side	effect],	I	just	want	to	[achieve	the	main	goal]",	"I feel	terrible	about	[the	side	effect]	but	priority	one	is	[to	achieve	the	main	goal]"	or	"That's	great news	about	[the	side	effect],	still	priority	one	is	[to	achieve	the	main	goal]".	As	I	pointed	out before,	it	is	an	interesting	result	of	Shepherd's	study	that	"the	valence	of	an	agent's	main	goal	or side	effect	significantly	impacts	folk	ascriptions	in	harming	cases,	[while]	the	agent's	attitude does	so	in	helping	cases."	(Shepherd	2011,	p.	181) As	I	will	point	out	in	the	following,	it	is	problematic	to	treat	the	change	of	the	agent's	attitude and	the	change	of	the	valence	of	the	main	goal	and	the	side	effect	as	if	they	had	a	completely independent	influence	on	what	subjects	conclude	about	the	respective	agent's	motivation;	the two	must	not	be	seen	as	distinct	in	the	experimental	setting.	By	changing	the	valence	of	the	main goal	or	the	side	effect	the	agent's	preference	structure	is	affected,	too,	when	the	agent	acts	on	the motive	to	achieve	the	main	goal.	An	agent	who	performs	an	action	disregarding	known	bad	side effects,	expresses	by	doing	so	her	attitude	that	the	achievement	of	the	main	goal	is	more important	for	her	than	the	avoidance	of	the	bad	side	effect.	Merely	adding	a	verbal	expression	of regret	cannot	overwrite	the	attitude	that	is	expressed	by	performing	the	action	though	a	verbal expression	may	sometimes	provide	some	missing	details	about	the	agent's	attitude.	Therefore,	it is	not	surprising	that	in	cases	of	bad	side	effects,	in	which	the	agent	decides	for	the	main	goal and	–	in	a	way	–	against	the	avoidance	of	the	side	effect,	there	is	no	significant	effect	visible	in the	results	when	the	agent	verbally	expresses	regret	about	producing	the	bad	side	effect.	The reason	for	this	is	simple:	had	the	regret	been	serious	or	strong	enough,	the	agent	would	have refrained	from	performing	the	action	in	the	first	place.	But	since	she	did	not,	subjects	are	not convinced	that	a	merely	verbal	expression	truly	mirrors	the	agent's	attitude	–	and	rightly	so. Though	having	expressed	regret	about	the	side	effect,	the	chairman	is	still	judged	to	be blameworthy	for	having	harmed	the	environment.	The	reluctance	to	excuse	the	caring	but	still profit	driven	chairman	explains	the	insignificance	of	an	effect	concerning	the	agent's	verbally expressed	attitude;	this	is	simply	not	what	the	agent's	attitude	can	be	reduced	to	when	the agent's	action	provides	further	and,	in	this	case,	more	reliable	information	about	the	agent's motive. Shepherd	admits	that	it	"seems	likely	that	in	certain	harming	cases,	an	agent's	attitude	will	have a	significant	impact."	Further,	he	adds	that	"[i]t	is	worth	noting,	however,	that	it	seems	that	the impact	will	be	much	less	than	that	of	the	valence."	(Shepherd	2011,	p.	176)	Against	this interpretation,	I	think	it	is	a	mistake	to	conclude	from	the	given	data	that	in	harm	cases	the agent's	attitude	has	no	impact	on	subjects'	judgments	and	that	only	the	valence	of	the	main	goal or	the	side	effect	has.	When	the	side	effect	of	the	city	planner's	program	is	worsened	from 'increasing	joblessness'	to	'increasing	cancer	levels',	and	in	both	scenarios	the	city	planner	says that	he	does	not	care	about	the	respective	harm,	this	is	highly	relevant	for	what	kind	of	attitude is	ascribed	to	the	agent!	The	agent	may	give	the	very	same	verbal	expression	in	both	cases,	but any	judgment	concerning	the	attitude	of	not	caring	about	x	and	not	caring	about	y	depends	on what	x	and	y	stand	for	and	what	their	intersubjective	valence	is.	An	agent's	attitude	who	does not	care	about	increasing	joblessness	is	bad	enough,	but	somebody	who	does	not	care	about increasing	cancer	levels	is	even	worse.	Here,	it	is	the	verbally	expressed	not	caring	attitude	that –	though	syntactically	identical	in	both	cases	–	leads	to	different	moral	judgments	concerning the	agent.	For	judging	an	agent's	attitude	it	is	important	what	the	agent	does	not	care	about. After	having	explained	why	a	change	in	the	verbal	expression	of	an	agent's	attitude	does	not	lead to	significant	results,	another	question	remains:	why	does	a	change	in	the	agent's	verbal expression	have	an	impact	on	survey	subjects'	ascriptions	of	intentionality	when	the	side	effect is	good?	There	is	a	difference	between	harm	and	help	scenarios	that	concerns	the	agent's attitude	and	motivation.	The	agent's	knowledge	that	a	bad	side	effect	will	result	from	an	action together	with	the	performance	of	that	action	disregarding	the	consequences	gives	enough information	about	the	agent's	attitude:	the	achievement	of	the	main	goal	is	more	important	for her	than	the	avoidance	of	the	bad	side	effect.	This	conclusion	cannot	be	made	in	help	scenarios, because	there	is	no	conflict	between	the	main	goal	and	the	side	effect	such	that	it	is intersubjectively	agreed	upon	that	the	action	should	be	omitted	for	the	sake	of	the	side	effect	not to	occur.	The	occurrence	of	a	good	side	effect	is	as	such	never	morally	problematic	as	a	bad	side effect	normally	is.	It	is	permissible	to	produce	good	side	effects.	However,	there	are intersubjective	expectations	also	in	help	scenarios	that	concern	the	agent's	attitude	and motivation.	A	proper	target	of	praise	is	required	to	(at	least)	meet	these	expectations.	For example,	the	chairman	who	prefers	making	profit	over	environmental	issues	does	not	act	on expected	preferences	even	if	the	side	effect	turns	out	to	be	a	good	one.	But	in	contrast	to	harm scenarios,	it	is	not	the	case	in	help	scenarios	that	the	motive	can	be	deduced	from	the performance	of	the	action	together	with	the	agent's	knowledge	about	the	side	effect.	In	help scenarios	further	information	is	needed	in	order	to	judge	whether	the	agent	is	a	proper	target	of praise	or	should	rather	be	expraised.	The	verbal	expression	of	the	agent's	attitude	provides	this sort	of	missing	information	in	the	helping	scenarios,	while	it	is	redundant	or	overwritten	in harm	scenarios.	While	the	information	that	the	agent	knows	about	the	bad	side	effect	in	harm scenarios	is	sufficient	for	judging	her	morally	when	she	performs	the	action	in	question,	the verbal	expression	of	the	agent's	attitude	is	required	in	the	help	scenario	for	that	judgment.	In cases	where	more	information	is	required	the	verbal	expression	determines	whether	subjects form	a	positive	reactive	attitude	(praise)	or	a	negative	reactive	attitude	(expraise).	That	explains why	manipulation	of	the	verbal	attitude	has	an	effect	in	help	scenarios	but	not	a	significant	one in	harm	scenarios. 4	Why	there	seems	to	be	an	asymmetry In	the	previous	sections	I	argued	against	the	common	view	that	the	effect	Knobe	and	following experimenters	found	represents	an	asymmetry	in	survey	subjects'	judgments.	In	this	section	I will	explain	why	the	results	can	only	be	interpreted	as	an	asymmetry	when	we	try	to	explain	the results	within	one	concept,	e.g.	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility	or	the	concept	of	intentional action.	I	will	focus	on	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility	here,	because	I	think	that	the asymmetric	ascriptions	of	intentionality	is	a	pragmatic	means	by	which	subjects	strengthen their	moral	judgments.	There	is	no	asymmetry	when	we	refer	to	positive	and	negative	reactive attitudes	and	distinguish	between	praise	and	excuse,	on	the	one	hand,	and	blame	and	expraise on	the	other.	When	the	judgment	'A	is	blameworthy'	is	replaced	by	the	allegedly	synonymous judgment	'A	is	morally	responsible',	and	'A	is	not	praiseworthy'	is	replaced	by	'A	is	not	morally responsible',	then	the	asymmetry	arises:	though	an	agent	who	is	blamed	or	expraised	is	judged negatively	in	both	cases,	she	is	seen	as	morally	responsible	in	one	case	but	not	morally responsible	in	the	other.	The	same	is	true	for	positive	judgments:	an	agent	who	is	praised	is	seen as	morally	responsible	but	not	when	she	is	excused	for	having	done	so.	Further,	an	agent	who	is judged	to	be	morally	blameworthy	is,	according	to	that	synonymous	treatment,	not distinguishable	from	an	agent	who	is	judged	to	be	praiseworthy	if	we	do	not	refer	to	the goodness	or	badness	of	the	relevant	side	effect.	In	both	cases,	the	agent	is	morally	responsible for	her	action	and	the	resulting	side	effects.	Accordingly,	an	agent	who	is	expraised	is	not distinguishable	from	an	agent	who	is	excused,	because	both	are	seen	as	not	morally	responsible. But	praising	and	blaming	are	completely	different	reactive	attitudes	as	well	as	excusing	and expraising	are:	while	blaming	and	expraising	are	negative	judgments	about	an	agent,	praising and	excusing	are	positive	judgments.	That	means	that	the	goodness	or	the	badness	of	an	action or	side	effect	does	not	determine	whether	the	judgment	is	positive	or	negative,	but	only	which kind	of	a	positive	or	negative	judgment	is	to	be	made. It	is	the	translation	of	expraise	and	excuse	into	'not	morally	responsible'	and	blame	and	praise into	'morally	responsible'	that	makes	an	asymmetry	appear.	Even	if	most	interpreters	do	not explicitly	use	moral	responsibility	as	a	synonym	for	either	praise	or	blame,	they	treat	the	notions 'blameworthy'	and	'not	praiseworthy'	as	if	there	is	one	and	the	same	underlying	concept	–	one time	in	the	affirmative	and	one	time	in	the	negative.	Implicitly	it	is	referred	to	the	concept	of moral	responsibility	that	is	assumed	to	unite	praise	and	blame.	However,	this	is	no	reason	to arrive	at	any	conclusions	about	an	asymmetry	within	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility;	we rather	should	conclude	that	the	concept	of	moral	responsibility	is	not	suitable	for	uniting judgments	like	praise	and	excuse	on	the	positive	side,	and	blame	and	expraise	on	the	negative side.	Indeed,	we	should	stop	looking	for	general	conditions	of	moral	responsibility	as	such,	and rather	provide	separate	accounts	for	positive	and	negative	moral	attitudes.	With	the replacement	of	'(not)	blameworthy'	by	'(not)	responsible'	and	the	replacement	of	'(not) praiseworthy'	by	'(not)	responsible'	the	respective	judgment's	context	becomes	lost. 5	Conclusion Similar	to	other	contributors	of	the	debate,	I	have	argued	for	interpreting	ascriptions	of intentionality	as	moral	judgments	about	the	agent	and	her	action;	but	this	was	not	my	main point.	Though	people	are	misled	by	the	experimental	setting	in	what	question	to	answer	and wrongly	try	to	emphasize	their	moral	judgment	by	ascription	or	non-ascription	of	intentionality, they	are	doing	the	right	thing	when	they	judge	the	not	caring	harming	chairman	to	be blameworthy	(via	an	ascription	of	intentionality)	and	the	not	caring	helping	chairman	to	be	not praiseworthy	(via	a	false	ascription	of	non-intentionality).	Knobe	claims	that	it	is	the	badness	of the	side	effect	as	such	that	makes	subjects	generally	more	inclined	to	ascribe	intentionality, while	the	goodness	of	the	side	effect	makes	subjects	refrain	from	doing	so.	This	could	be transferred	to	moral	judgment:	while	the	badness	of	the	side	effect	makes	subjects	generally more	inclined	to	blame	an	agent,	the	goodness	of	the	side	effect	makes	subjects	refrain	from doing	so.	But	Knobe's	interpretation	is	flawed.	As	it	can	be	seen	in	Shepherd's	extended	study, there	are	also	reversed	ascriptions	of	intentionality	towards	agents	who	perform	actions	with good	side	effects	and	non-ascriptions	of	intentionality	towards	agents	who	perform	actions	with bad	side	effects.	Knobe's	original	scenarios	of	a	helping	and	a	harming	chairman	are	restricted	to negative	judgments	only:	the	chairman	of	the	harm	and	the	one	of	the	help	scenario	act	on unacceptable	preferences	that	do	not	match	intersubjective	expectations,	because	both	do	not care	about	the	environment	and	both	prefer	to	make	profit.	Whether	a	moral	judgment	is negative	or	positive	is	not	determined	by	the	goodness	or	badness	of	the	side	effect;	it	is	the agent's	preference	structure	that	is	decisive	for	this.	However,	the	goodness	or	badness	of	the side	effect	determines	whether	the	judgment	is,	if	negative,	a	judgment	of	blame	or	expraise	and, correspondingly,	whether	the	judgment	is,	if	positive,	a	judgment	of	praise	or	excuse.	That means	that	there	is	no	asymmetry	between	the	negative	attitudes	of	blame	and	expraise,	on	the one	hand,	and	none	between	the	positive	attitudes	of	praise	and	excuse	on	the	other.	An asymmetry	only	arises	between	negative	and	positive	attitudes,	e.g.	between	praise	as	a	positive attitude	and	expraise	as	a	negative;	and	the	same	between	blame	as	a	negative	attitude	and excuse	as	a	positive.	An	asymmetry	between	ascriptions	of	blame	and	expraise	only	arises	if	the two	are	read	as	'morally	responsible'	and	'not	morally	responsible'.	When	blame	and	expraise are	read	in	this	way,	it	cannot	be	seen	that	both	of	them	are	negative	judgments	and	perfectly symmetric. In	this	paper,	I	did	not	analyse	the	concept	of	moral	judgment	sufficiently	but	only	tried	to	make sense	of	the	experimental	data	provided	so	far.	I	am	convinced	that	the	interpretation	of	such data	can	be	useful	for	philosophical	inquiry	concerning	the	concepts	of	praise	and	excuse	as	well as	blame	and	expraise	if	we	are	interested	in	what	people	are	doing	when	forming	moral judgments.	Lastly,	the	data	clearly	supports	my	claim	that	moral	responsibility	is	not	a	concept under	which	praise	and	blame	can	be	equally	subsumed. References F.	Adams	and	A.	Steadman	(2004a)	'Intentional	action	in	ordinary	language:	Core	concept	or pragmatic	understanding?',	Analysis,	64,	173–181. F.	Adams	and	A.	Steadman	(2004b)	'Intentional	action	and	moral	considerations:	Still	pragmatic', Analysis,	64,	268–276. M.	Phelan	and	H.	Sarkissian	(2008)	'The	folk	strike	back;	or,	why	you	didn't	do	it	intentionally, though	it	was	bad	and	you	knew	it',	Philosophical	Studies,	138,	291–298. J.	Knobe	(2003)	'Intentional	action	and	side	effects	in	ordinary	language',	Analysis,	63,	190–193. J.	Knobe	(2006)	'The	concept	of	intentional	action:	a	case	study	in	the	uses	of	folk	psychology', Philosophical	Studies,	130,	203–231. D.	Pettit	and	J.	Knobe	(2009)	'The	Pervasive	Impact	of	Moral	Judgment',	Mind	and	Language,	24, 586–604.